Will climate change affect how armed actors behave toward civilians? Scholars analyzed different links between environmental variability and war, but research on links between the former and violence against civilians is very limited. Focusing on the Sahara Desert transition zone, a band of land stretching across the entire African continent, we argue that climate harshness raises the willingness of actors to engage in competitive violence over resources. An underlying condition is this violence happens in times of greater environmental security, which provides opportunity for actors to engage in violence. We test this argument using statistical analysis of a newly released climate-conflict geospatial dataset and find support for this theoretical expectation. The conclusion outlines both research and policy implications.
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Researchers and policymakers often claim that harsh climate conditions intensify the risk of armed conflict by acting as a “threat multiplier.” Yet, new data reveal that locations with seasonal environmental variations face higher conflict risk than locations with permanently harsh climate, e.g., due to the ability of populations accustomed to harsh climatic conditions to develop adaptation practices. Focusing on the Sahel, we investigate underexplored relationships between the location and timing of environmental and agricultural resource variability, and their impact on conflict. We argue that in desert-transition locations, harsh climate gives people a greater willingness to engage in competitive violence over resources compared with other locations. However, this will happen only in times of relatively high levels of environmental security and agricultural resource abundance, which give people the opportunity to act on these incentives. We test this argument on a new monthly dataset of 0.5 by 0.5-degree grid cells covering the entire African continent and find robust support for our expectations. In illustrating that both spatially and temporally disaggregated data are necessary for understanding climate-conflict relationships, our findings delineate new directions of research and policymaking.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has constrained the ability of states across the world to govern and control their territories. As the state reduces its activities, space opens for violent nonstate actors working for and against the state to fill the vacuum. Highlighting this trend, the present study evaluates the effects of COVID-19 and pandemics more broadly on attacks by nonstate actors. Our theory emphasizes the incentives of both rebels and pro-government nonstate actors (PGNs) to increase their attack frequency as disease spreads and the state retracts its governance activities to preserve resources needed elsewhere. In the first case, we highlight how the pandemic allows rebels to reduce asymmetries of power with respect to the military and establish themselves as a viable government alternative. In the second case, PGNs, which provide an alternative to militaries, are deployed to these contested spaces to thwart or preempt rebellion during the pandemic. Employing daily level data on the annual change in armed conflict and COVID-19 cases across 127 countries between 1 January 2020 and 15 June 2020, we test both claims using an econometric identification strategy. We do not find clear evidence that COVID-19 led to a higher frequency of rebel attacks, suggesting that these groups prefer to bolster their standing using nonviolent means, or avoid fighting and preserve their resources. In contrast, we find that the frequency of PGN attacks has increased with COVID-19 prevalence compared with last year. Case studies of insurgent and PGN activity in Afghanistan and Nigeria lend additional support to these results, illustrating some underlying mechanisms. Our findings explore overlooked challenges that pandemics and other disasters pose to conflict mitigation and the role PGNs play in these contexts.
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New data and case-based evidence suggests that locations with seasonal climate variations may face a higher risk of civilian targeting than locations with permanent harsh climatic conditions. Focusing on the Sahel and the Sahara Desert transition zone, this report develops a conditional policy framework to better understand the causes of and improve preparedness for climate-driven civilian targeting by armed actors.
This issue brief argues that the relationship between climatic stressors and environmental conditions is moderated: violence increases in climate-harsh regions – where incentives for violence over resources are higher – but only during months where environmental security levels are higher, which prompts armed actors to loot agricultural resources and use violence to this end. We hypothesize that while climate-harsh locations are more likely to induce willingness on the part of the military, rebels, and militias to engage in violence along resource scarcity lines, they will only act on these incentives when environmental conditions improve. In these times, more resources are available, facilitating military operations and allowing groups and military organizations – especially those living off locally-sourced food and other resources – to support their troops effectively.
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This post show that the Covid-19 pandemic led to increase in the activity levels of militias and other armed pro-government organizations.
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